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The Financial and Operating Performance of 
Privatized Firms in Sweden 
 
This paper examines the change in operating and financial performance of Swedish firms 
that were either partly or fully privatized during the period of 1989-2007. Two different 
methods are used to empirically investigate the performance of privatized firms. First, 
accounting data prior to and after the privatization are employed to measure the operating 
performance of privatized firms. We have found no significant difference in performances 
under state and private ownerships. Second, a return-based event study is found useful to 
measure the financial performance of privatized firms, since all the firms in the sample that 
were privatized have used an initial public offering (IPO). This approach allows comparison to 
the rest of the IPOs that were launched in the same period. It is found that the cumulative 
returns for the privatized firms are significantly different to private counterparts. Overall 
results, however, show that the privatization in Sweden was not as successful as it might 
have been expected and in comparison with those in other countries. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The last 20 years have witnessed privatization programs on a global scale in both 
developed and developing countries. Different political parties with different 
ideological backgrounds have strongly pursued the change from state socialism with 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) to market based capitalism. The OECD (2003) estimated 
that over the past two decades, more than 100 countries worldwide have adopted 
privatization policies. Megginson et al. (1996) have emphasised that revenues from 
privatization through initial public offerings (IPO) have reached US $400 billion since 
1979 and are expected to grow with an equal pace. According to Gibbon (1998), $860 
billion has been raised by the governments worldwide through selling state owned 
enterprises since 1987. Roche (1996) predicts that no less than $6 trillion will be raised 
through privatizations over the next two decades. In 1997 alone, sales of public 
enterprises reached a total record of $161 billion worldwide.  
 
Many European countries have launched privatization programs since 1980. Among 
them, Great Britain is referred to as the origin of modern privatization: Margaret 
Thatcher’s government privatized many state-owned enterprises, including British 
Petroleum in 1979, British Telecom and British Airways. In France, privatization was 
very dependent on the political situation and the political party in the power. The first 
privatization started in 1986 with Elf Aquitaine. It was discontinued until 1993 when 
the socialist government left the office (see Schneider and Hofreither, 1990).  
 
In most industrialised economies, privatization policies have been promoted on the 
grounds that it improves the efficiency of SOEs, raises large amounts of revenues for 
the government and promotes general public’s share ownership in cases where 
companies are sold by shares to the public. There is a view that all government 
intervention in the market place represents some restriction to individual liberty and, 
hence, is intrinsically undesirable. This withdrawal of state involvement in industry, 
which came to be known as ’privatization’, takes place through a number of policy 
initiatives. The most common is a change from public to private in the ownership of an 
enterprise (or part of an enterprise). Alternatively, public enterprise may remain in 
existence while privatization takes place without transfer of ownership of assets. 
Falling into this category are liberalization involving deregulation of controls on entry, 
price, output and profit, as well as the adoption of a commercial approach. According 
this approach, the provision of a goods or service moves from the public to the private 
sector, but with ultimate responsibility for providing the service remaining with the 
government, frequently referred to as “contracting-out”.  
 
Positive views of privatization point to a number of benefits resulting from its adoption. 
Because privatization undermines the role of the unions, it permits a tough labour 
policy, which deals with the problems caused by inefficient workers, and thereby 
makes controlling employment levels much easier. It also permits the public sector 
economy to become familiar with ‘the enterprise culture’ as well as with the 
mechanism of the market place, leading to the rationalization of asset portfolios and the 
strategic reorganization of investment. This in turn leads to improvement of the 
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 company’s balance sheets, introducing sensitivity and product quality improvement 
while providing adequate facilities for merging as required by the economics of 
international competition. Furthermore, since public managers and politicians may act 
in favour of each other, issues such as wage levels, investment plans, borrowing 
requirements and restructuring projects are assumed to be resolved by this internal 
relationship. Privatization supposedly breaks up this relationship and introduces a more 
efficient process of decision-making.   
 
A final argument in favour of privatization identifies a number of financial benefits to 
the policy. Firstly, the sale of public enterprises results in the removal of their capital 
investment programs from the public sector accounts; consequently, public sector 
borrowing is reduced. Secondly, it has been argued that private companies have more 
direct and faster access to the international capital market than public companies do.  
Thirdly, privatization contributes to the growth of the stock exchange, and can widen 
the capital market by bringing in many new investors. Fourthly, privatization helps to 
minimise the commercial risk, and therefore reduces economic problems for the 
government in different periods, especially when the market is volatile or in recession.  
It seems, however, that the above principle does not apply to private companies. It 
should be noted that, the limited evidence from the recent financial crisis shows that the 
state is invited to intervene in the private market to rescue banking, automobile and real 
estate markets in crisis to stabilize the financial market and to prevent bankruptcies and 
subsequent increasing unemployment. 
 
In terms of theoretical literature a large amount have dealt with the consequences of 
privatizations in terms of efficiency gains, different incentive structures, and increased 
competitive pressure, only a few empirical studies look at privatization programs either 
on a national or international scale.  
 
Among the empirical studies on the post-privatization performance several World Bank 
studies appear as the most comprehensive studies (see Galal et al., 1994; Megginson et 
al., 1994; Megginson et al., 1996; and Boubakri and Cosset, 1998). The first study 
analyzes the post-privatization performance of 12 companies from the most regulated 
industries in Britain, Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico. The World Bank did look at the 
economic consequences of privatization from an international perspective. The second 
study compared the pre- and post-privatization financial and operating performance of 
61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries  that  either  experienced  a  full  or  
partial  privatization  through  public  share  offerings during the period of 1961-1990. 
The third study took an international perspective and its focus was more on 
privatization programs in developed countries. In contrast, the last study focused on the 
financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms in developing countries. 
In spite of these differences to the other studies, they also found that the performance of 
the enterprises showed significant improvements after their privatization.  
 
In this paper we look at the financial and operating performance of privatized firms in 
Sweden. A large-scale privatization program took place from 1989, when shares of the 
SSAB, one of Sweden’s heavy enterprises within the manufacturing sector, were sold 
at the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The SSAB was followed by firms like the Celsius 
AB, AssiDoman AB and Pharmacia AB. Until now, many of the large state owned 
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 enterprises, apart from very few like Nordea Banken AB, are being privatized by 
selling shares. 
 
We firstly analyzed accounting data of those Swedish enterprises that experienced 
either a full or partial change in government ownership through an Initial Public 
Offering. This data is used to evaluate their performances prior to and after the 
privatization. What we have found does not support the studies cited above. Strong 
empirical support for improvements in profitability, efficiency, and other financial 
variables is not found. This can be conclusive that the operating performance of 
privatized firms has not been very strong. One of the reasons for these empirical 
findings can be referred to the type of privatization that largely occurred in Sweden. 
This can be attributed to the fact that, among the ten firms present in the sample, none 
of those firms experienced full privatization. This might refer to the influence of the 
state and conclude that it is still strong, and might account for the results.  
 
The second step of analysing, the pre-and-post privatization performance, involves 
using share prices of the privatized firms and it calculate returns to measure the 
financial performance on the basis of cumulative excess returns. The cumulative 
abnormal returns of the privatized firms are compared to those firms that experienced 
an IPO during the same period. The result shows that the abnormal returns of the 
privatized firms are significantly different from those of the regular IPO firms.  
 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, theories in favour of 
privatization will briefly be discussed. The third section is devoted to the data and the 
methodology used for testing the hypothesis to measure the operating and financial 
performance. Section 4 presents the results for the operating performance of firms.  
Section 5 evaluates the financial performance of privatized firms on the basis of 





There are several different schools of thought in favour of privatization, each of which 
addresses one particular aspect of this economic adjustment. It is worth emphasising 
that these schools unlike their recent application date as far back as 1870. Thus, schools 
of thought on privatization can be divided into two categories based on when they 
emerged. The first category consists of the Austrian School, the Property Rights School 
and the Public Choice School. The second category, which refers to recent ideas, is 
comprised of the Principal-Agent Theory, the New Political Economy, the New 
Austrian School of Economics and the New Institutional Economics.   
 
The property rights analysis of public ownership leads to the conclusion that public 
enterprises are less economically efficient than private enterprises. Thus, forms of 
ownership generate different rewards/penalties. Generally, the more dispersed property 
rights are, the less motivated their holders will be to use their assets efficiently. 
Moreover, according to the property rights school, the separation of ownership and 
management, which is characteristic of the modern corporation, does not lead to any 
fundamental change in the performance of private enterprise. It acknowledges that 
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 shareholders in a large corporation are not able to monitor management as closely as a 
manager-owned company, but asserts that there are other factors at work in the modern 
corporation that compensate for this. 
 
The public choice perspective, like the theory of property rights, holds very strong 
views about public ownership. The fact that ‘public enterprises necessarily perform less 
efficiently than private enterprises,’ Starr (1989: 31) provides an influential economic 
case for privatization. Privatization allows profit-maximising decision-making to take 
place. Under public ownership, political motives, which lead to large subsidies and 
other concessions, are much more important than cost efficiency. Key public officials 
and ministers may pursue higher goals than operational efficiency leading to a higher 
cost of production. By contrast, privatization frees an enterprise from the burden of 
political interference and non-market criteria. Thus it limits politicians’ ability to 
redirect the enterprise’s activities in order to promote their personal agenda or to yield 
short-term political pressures at the expense of market efficiency. This clarifies the 
objectives of the enterprise and leads to the enhancement of economic performance. 
 
The Austrian school points to the fact that continual changes over time in tastes, 
techniques, available resources, prices, plans and expectations require that individuals 
(economic agents) be allowed to arrange their property as they see fit, in order to gain 
access to more and better knowledge than would be possible with less freedom of 
action (Moldofsky, 1989). The welfare of economic agents is improved in a 
competitive market which allows them to learn what consumers want, how much they 
are willing to pay, what factors and methods of production are available and so on.   
This process continuously ensures that resources are reallocated to new preferable uses 
in the best possible way. The competitive market provides an environment in which 
products will be produced by someone who can do so more cheaply than anybody who 
does not produce it, and that each product is sold at a lower price, (Hayek, 1984). The 
competitive market, whose foundation is price and shared economic knowledge, can 
generally only exist in the context of private ownership. It follows that privatization, 
via the introduction of competition, will improve efficiency and sensitivity to consumer 
demand, with a better quality and range of goods and services (Littlechild, 1986). 
 
Principal-agent theory also views critically the state–owned enterprises. It asserts that, 
in the case of public enterprises, there is no efficient mechanism by which the 
principals (the public) can control the actions of their agents (government officials); 
thus, inefficiency is allocated to state enterprises. In general, the agents pursue their 
own goals in a world of information asymmetries, incomplete contracts and the absence 
of clear objectives. If the reverse were the case, then the ownership would be a problem 
and agents could have acted according to contracts. Moreover, because the incentive is 
weak and unrelated to the profit motive in state enterprises, agents have no enthusiasm 
to achieve the highest efficiency level (Bos, 1991). In contrast, private ownership sets a 
precise restriction on the managerial behaviour by linking it to expected future profits.  
If profits are expected to decline, it will squeeze share prices and increase takeover 
bids. Large shareholders clearly know the consequences of poor managerial 
performance; hence they have enough incentive to motivate managerial behaviours.  
More importantly, because managerial salaries in the private sector are linked to profit, 
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 stock options and bonuses, while in the public sector it is tied to fixed salary scales, the 
managerial motives will differ leading to different effort and outcomes. 
 
The new political economy sees rent seeking behaviour from government intervention 
into the market. It also sees these interventions as destroying a perfectly competitive 
environment. The new institutional economics sees the internal organisation of the firm 
as separate from its external market relations. It also sees that the economic agent has 
limited power to obtain all available information and that market transactions are not 
costless. Non-market institutions cannot act optimally, but individuals can. The neo-
Austrian school of economics, unlike the two other schools sees the market economy as 
a dynamic phenomenon in an uncertain and changing world. Individual economic 
agents are assumed to be the main source of decision-making; that decision-making is 
based on all the information and knowledge they are able to obtain.    
 
The most important conclusions that can be extracted from the study of these three 
newly founded schools of thought are that:  
 
1.  The characteristic of the new ownership is much more important than the role 
played by competition and regulation.    
 
2.  Private sector economy and, in this regard, privatization are much more favourable 
than public sector economy.   
 
3.  All the above schools are in favour of privatization and see the adjustments from 
the public to the private sector as a significant movement for enhancing the 
economy as a whole.    
 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
The data of public enterprises, which were privatized, partially or fully, as IPOs at the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange are collected. The time period was chosen between 1989 
and 2007. As a consequence of these selection criteria, 10 firms are included in the 
sample. As can be seen in Table 1, the Swedish government has emphasised to 
privatize public enterprises of different sizes and operating in different sectors of the 
economy such as manufacturing, forest industry, pharmaceutical, finance and banking 
industry, media industry, and services including hotel, and telecommunications. The 
variation in the initial value of transactions is large and lies in the interval $73.4 and 
$7,646.4 million (see Table 2).  
 
Insert Table 1 and 2 about here 
 
The following approach is used to measure the operating performance of these firms.  
Based on accounting data that were collected from business reports, either from the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange or direct information from those enterprises or DataStream, 
we have carried out our analysis. These data are then adjusted for inflation. The 
monetary variables are transformed into fixed prices by using consumer price index. A 
number of accounting ratios that are appropriate for evaluating the performance of 
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 firms prior to and after the privatization are employed. Those ratios are used for 
measuring (i) profitability, (ii) operating efficiency, (iii) capital investment, (iv) capital 
structure, (v) employment level, and (vi) liquidity of firms. Profitability is measured in 
three different ways as returns on sales, equity and investment. Two operating 
efficiency measures are obtained as sales per employee and net income efficiency. 
Capital investment is measured as capital expenditure to sales and to total assets, while 
capital expenditure is computed as equity ratio and as structure of short-term debt. The 
ratios are summarised in detail in Table 3.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
These eleven performance criterion are used to evaluate the financial performance of 
those privatized firms. An event study is accomplished to evaluate each firm’s equity 
return performances through looking at the shares’ abnormal returns. To assess the 
performance changes of privatized firms the descriptive statistics is discussed in details. 
To test whether or not a statistically significant change after privatization took place, 
two tests are carried out: (i) the Wilcoxon test and (ii) the Standard test for differences 
in the mean performance of the two populations.    
 
The Wilcoxon singed rank test, which is a parameter free test, is especially well-suited 
for cases with small sample sizes. Two periods are identified; one prior to privatization 
as one population and after privatization as the second one for carrying out the second 
test to identify differences in the mean of the two populations. Despite the fact that the 
assumptions underlying the Wilcoxon test are always satisfied, the proper application 
of the test for differences in the mean of two populations requires the assumption of 
normal distributions. Consequently, this test should only be considered as 
complementary to the parameter free Wilcoxon test. 
 
Abnormal returns generated during the period of the IPO are used as procedure for 
measuring the financial performance of the firms. What was being considered most was 
to examine whether or not privatized firms display statistically different cumulative 
abnormal returns compared to other private IPOs that were undertaken during the same 
period.   
 
Firms that were privatized as IPOs at the Stockholm Stock Exchange are being 
considered as our broad data set. The time period was chosen between 1989 and 2007. 
Companies which are declined from the Stockholm Stock Exchange (Pharmacia and 
Rezidor Hotel Group) are excluded from our sample. The final sample consists of 8 
privatized IPOs and 9 private IPOs. The sample chosen for the evaluation of the 
financial performance and their time of IPO is shown in Table 4.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 
4. Operating Performance of Privatized Firms  
 
Schools of thought, as well as politicians in favour of privatization, have pointed to the 
productivity growth and the allocative efficiency under private ownership, compared 
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 with public enterprises under public ownership. Theories such as the property rights 
theory, the public choice theory, the principal-agent theory, the Austrian school of 
economics, as well as some new theories like the new political economics, the new 
institutional economics and the neo-Austrian school of economic generally favour 
private ownership and view state ownership as inefficient, especially when the market 
is characterized as competitive. We consider, as the first step, the following hypotheses 
to test whether or not these expectations are met. As the second step, we look at the 
change in performance, on average over the last two years before and the first two years 
after privatization. Table 5 summarises the state of the 11 performance indicators for 
individual years and average period results before and after privatization.  
 
Insert Table 5a and 5b about here 
 
A. Profitability  
 
It has been claimed that privatization will lead to change in economic prospects and it 
will allow profit-maximising entrepreneurs to be the main source of economic 
performance. Operational efficiency is guaranteed, leading to a lower cost of 
production. Political pressures to redirect the enterprise’s activities at the expense of 
market efficiency will be eliminated. Large subsidies and other special economic 
considerations will be minimised and the search for ways to reduce costs will no longer 
be necessary. All these remedies lead to enhanced economic performance. Hence, we 
expect the profitability to increase after privatization took place. To measure 
profitability return on sales, return on equity and return on assets are chosen. On 
average, all of these ratios have improved after privatization for the first year, and for 
the second year they have declined again to levels below their pre-privatization levels 
but despite deteriorated condition the period averages suggest small improvement in 
profitability. 
 
B. Operating Efficiency  
 
Private ownership is believed to improve corporate performance through incentives, 
and market phenomena are seen as disciplinary mechanisms for allocating resources 
efficiently. Moreover, the idea that the public sector acts against the public interest and 
efficiency - while the private sector is controlled by market discipline, the public sector 
serves the interests of managers or politicians. In the presence of market discipline, the 
role of the entrepreneurial factor in the market and relaxation of any barriers is believed 
to improve entrepreneurs’ behaviours. Further to this, it is claimed that creating greater 
competition is assumed to be more important than ownership. As a consequence, we 
anticipate efficiency to increase after privatization took place. To measure this 
efficiency is measured by means of two ratios, sales and profit per employee.  Sales per 
employee decreased within the period before and after privatization. As far as profits 
per employee are concerned, there was a positive change from losses to significant 
profits after privatization. 
 
C. Capital Investment  
 
Theoretically, one can argue that private firm investment is based on a net present value 
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 principle. From this view point, it may not be the case as far as state-owned enterprises 
are concerned. National governments, however, have utilised state-owned enterprises 
as an instrument to accelerate slow growing economies by additional investment 
spending. As a result of that public firms always had the credit rating as such to borrow 
almost unlimited funds at prime rates. These would suggest that investment spending is 
higher under state ownership as well as privatized firms compared with private ones. 
Hence, we assume that investment spending will increase for privatized firms. To 
evaluate this hypothesis we use two alternative measures: capital expenditure to sale 
and capital expenditure to total assets. As Table 5a shows both ratios have increased 
after privatization has taken place and then decreased again with small net positive 
effect.  
 
D. Capital Structure  
 
We assume that privatization will lead to reduced level of debt. This is based on the 
fact that a state-owned enterprise has much more debt capacity than a private firm. 
Furthermore, the credit rating of public firms is assumed to be higher than for private 
ones, given no-default risk of government activities. Hence, privatized firms would 
experience lower ratings and higher costs of debt. The increased costs of debt will 
result in the firms adjusting their capital structures. The financial performance is 
measured by means of two financial variables; the equity ratio, which measures equity 
as percentage of total assets, and a measure for short term debt (short term debt as 
percentage of total debt). This study shows that the equity ratio increased, and the rate 
of debt declined after privatization. Short-term debts were declined after privatization 
and have increased again afterward.  
 
E. Employment  
 
To measure the allocative performance of privatized firms, the employment level prior 
to and after the privatization is used. The aim is to examine whether or not efficiency 
gains result from reductions in the labour force. From theoretical view points, as 
priority is given to minimise the cost in the initial step, in the short run, the level of 
employments will slump. However, in the long-run as the cost efficiency results in 
lower production costs, the number of employment will increase. We found that the 
level of employment has increased in the first year of privatization and it has declined 
substantially afterward.  
 
F. Liquidity  
 
Liquidity is used as our final measure. It was increased meeting expectations of 
increased cash flows.  
 
The descriptive statistic results hint at an improvement in the profitability, productivity 
somehow and allocative performance of enterprises after privatization. The test results 
are in line with what we could expect from our descriptive statistics reported in Table 
5a and 5b. In Table 6, we present the results of the Wilcoxon test of zero median vs 
non-zero median. We show the test statistics and the corresponding critical values for a 
significance level of 5%.  
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We work with the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the 11 
ratios measuring profitability, efficiency, investment spending, capital structure, 
employment, and liquidity before and after privatization.  
 
The Wilcoxon test shows that all of those measures for which the null hypothesis, the 
median is zero, must be rejected and with the exception of liquidity all tests are 
statistically significant. Hence, from a statistical point of view, profitability, productive 
as well as allocative efficiency have been improved after privatization.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
 
5. Financial Performances of Privatized Firms 
 
5.1 Event Study Methodology 
 
An event study is deployed to evaluate the financial performance of privatized firms 
compared with the private firms listed in the Stockholm Stock Exchange in the same 
period. This can be a useful method, since all the privatized firms included in our sample 
are stock listed companies through an IPO.  
 
The long-run performance of the IPOs is considered on the basis of abnormal returns for 
the privatized and at the same time their private firm counterparts. For each firm in the 
sample, the abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual ex post stock 
return and the normal return (see McKinley, 1997).  
 
Thus, for firm i and in time period t the abnormal return is obtained as:  
 
) ( t it it it X R E R AR − =          ( 1 )  
 
where   is the abnormal return,  and  it AR it R ) ( t it X R E are the actual and normal 
returns for time t, respectively, and Xt represents the conditioning information for the 
return model.  
For measuring the normal return the market model is deployed. The return of any given 
security is conditioning on the return of the market portfolio. Moreover, a stable linear 
relation between these two returns is assumed. For any security, the market model 
states that the actual return of a given security at time t is:  
 
it mt i i it R R ε β α + + =         ( 2 )  
 
where Rmt is the time t return of the market portfolio, αi and βi are market model 
parameters and εit is a normally distributed zero mean disturbance term with variance 
 ,  i.e., 
2




Our sample of firms consists of 10 private firms and 10 state-owned firms that were 
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 privatized during the years 1989 to 2007. For making our approach straightforward, we 
denote private firms as type 1 firms and the state-owned firms as type 2 firms. Moreover, 
we will introduce the following indexing of returns to make progress in the 
measurement and the analysis of abnormal returns.  
 
The time period t (t=1, 2, ....., T) is divided into three sub-periods: estimation 
window, event window and post-event window where the sub-periods thresholds are 
marked by T0, T1, T2 and T3. Defining t=0 as the IPO date, the estimation window of 
length L1=T1-T0 is from T0+1 through T1, the event window of length L2=T2-T1 from 
T1+1 through T2, and the length L3=T3-T2 ranging from T2+1 through T3 constitutes 
the post-estimation window.   
 
L1 and L2 are assumed to be the length of the estimation window and the post-
estimation window, respectively. Three different estimation window lengths of 200, 
400, and 750 days for both types of firms are used, i.e., L1=200, 400, 750, to estimate the 
market model parameters of the normal return for a given stock in the sample. The 
estimation of our regression parameters is based on the Swedish Traded Index (STX) 
which serves as the comparative market index. The ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression method is selected to estimate the market model parameters. For firm i, for 
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Estimating these two parameters,  i α ˆ   and  , for each firm, gives opportunity to 
calculate sample abnormal returns for dates t=T
i β ˆ
1+1, ....., T2 over a post-estimation 
window of 1000 days (i.e., L2=1000) according to: 
 
mt i i it it R R AR β α ˆ ˆ − − =          ( 5 )  
 
To compare the post IPO performance of these two types of firms, the aggregate of 
the individual securities’ abnormal returns over each of the two types of firms is used. 
For a sample size of Nj individual firms of type j (j = 1, 2), the sample average abnormal 









          ( 6 )  
 
where j  =  1, 2.  The average abnormal returns of each of the two types of firms, over 
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 the post-estimation window, are used to find aggregate abnormal returns. For any 
interval T1+1 to T2≤T2 in the post-estimation window, the average cumulative abnormal 












j AR T T CAR          ( 7 )  
 
5.2 Results from the Empirical Study  
 
Figure 1 show the cumulative abnormal returns averaged across the corresponding sample 
size of firms in each of the two types that result from the estimation of the market model 
parameters over the three different estimation window lengths L1.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The results illustrate that type 1 (private) firms go one better than type 2 (state-owned) 
firms. For all three estimation windows, the plot in Figure 1 shows that for both types 
the average sample cumulative abnormal return is fluctuating over time. To substantiate 
these results several test statistics based on the standard errors and average abnormal 
returns of the sample reported in different tables are carried out.  
 
The first test takes account of, the null hypothesis, H0 that the sample abnormal average 
return is equal to zero, i.e., under H0 the distribution of the sample abnormal return 
averaged across all firms in the sample of type j at a given observation in the post 
estimation window is: 
 
j
t AR ~                ( 8 )   ) , 0 ( 2 σ N
 
Using the sample mean µ, the standard error s, and the sample size n, of the aggregated 
abnormal returns reported in Table 7 and 8, H0 can be tested using the following test 
statistic:  
 
s n T / µ =                ( 9 )  
 
Insert Table 7 and 8 here 
 
For a critical value of α=5% or 0.05, H0 can be rejected whenever |T|>1.96.  For the average 
abnormal returns based on the market model parameters that were estimated using the 200 
days estimation period (L1=200), the test statistic yields -0.4385 and 9.5152 for the type 
1 and type 2 firms, respectively. Similarly, based on the 400 days estimation window 
(L1=400) we obtain test statistic values of 0.5832 and -14.8252 for type 1 and type 2 
firms, respectively. Hence, for both estimation procedures, the 200 and 400 days 
estimation window, the null hypothesis that the sample abnormal average return is equal 
to zero can be rejected for only, type 2 firms at a confidence level of 5%.  However, for 
the average abnormal return calculations based on the 750 days estimation window (L1 
=750),we obtain test statistic values of -3.1074 and -6.0964 for the type 1 and type 2 
firms, respectively, and consequently can reject the null hypothesis for both types.   
12 
  
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
Second test involves the null hypothesis that the mean sample abnormal return for both 
types of firms is equal. The averaged abnormal returns of the sample mean across type 1 
and type 2 firms are denoted by µ1 and µ2. The null hypothesis is: H0: µ1=µ2. Using this test 
statistic: 
 




1 2 1 n s n s T + − = µ µ           ( 1 0 )  
 
The H0 can be rejected at a confidence level of α=0.05 whenever |T|>1.96. For the three 
estimation windows, i.e., L1=200, 400 and 750, we obtain test statistic values of -0.8688, 
08680, and -0.0307, respectively. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal 
means of the two types of firms and conclude that the sample average mean of abnormal 
returns of type 1 (private) firms is significantly higher than the one of type 2 (state-
owned) firms. 
 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
Finally, the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from T1+1 to T2 that is over the 
entire post-estimation window are tested for the two null hypotheses above. Under the 
first null hypothesis, that the average cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero:  
 
) , 1 ( 2 1 T T CAR




where   is the variance of the average cumulative returns. Using the appropriate test 
statistic values for L
2
c σ
1=200, of 1.4333 and 7.2934 for type 1 and type 2 firms, respectively 
are found. Similarly, based on the 400 days estimation window, L1=400, test statistic 
values of -8.9810 and 2.3185 for type 1 and type 2 firms, respectively are obtained. Finally, 
for the 750 days estimation window, L1=750, test statistic values of -14.1804 and -
16.4760 for the type 1 and type 2 firms, respectively are found. Hence, for all estimation 
procedures the 200, 400 and 750 days estimation  window, apart from  L1=200  for type 
1, the null hypothesis has to be rejected for type 1 as well as type 2 firms at a confidence 
level of 5%.  
 
Insert Table 11 about here 
 
The second test involves whether CAR
1 (T1+1, T2) is significantly different from CAR
2 
(T1+1, T2). Under the second null hypothesis the cumulative abnormal return over the 
entire post-estimation window is the same for type 1 as well as type 2 firms. For the 
three estimation windows, i.e., L1=200, 400 and 750, we obtain test statistic values of 
118.4070, -42.390, and -20.3063, respectively. Thus, for L1=200, L1=400 and L1=750 
we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the sample average cumulative abnormal 
return of type 1 (private) firms is significantly higher than the one of type 2 (state-
owned) firms.   
 
Insert Table 12 about here 
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Our analysis so far is build up on the assumption that the zero mean disturbance term, εit , 
from the market model, used to measure the normal return, is normally distributed with 
constant variance  , i.e.,  2
it σ it ε ~N(0,  ). This assumption may not hold since volatility 
is a commonly observed feature of return series. To overcome this problem we consider 
heteroskedasticity  effects into account. A new model known as Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity GARCH (1, 1) process is introduced to 




ε σ i iT. The time variation is 
introduced by formulating the disturbance term of the market model
 as: 
  
it it it h v = ε             ( 1 2 )  
 




1 1 0 − − + + = it i it i i it h w w h λ ε           ( 1 3 )  
 
As the last approach of this section, the results obtained from extending the model to 
time varying variance of the disturbance term is presented briefly. Figure 2 shows the 
resulting average cumulative abnormal returns for the three different estimation window 
lengths L1. It indicates that type 1 (private) firms performed somehow better than type 
2 (state-owned) firms. For all three estimation windows, the plot in Figure 2 shows that 
the average sample cumulative abnormal return is increasing more rapidly for type 1 
firms.  
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Insert Tables 13 and 14 about here 
 
The test statistics carried out on the basis of the standard errors and average abnormal 
returns of the sample are reported in Table 15 and 16. The test of the null hypothesis that 
the sample abnormal average return of type 1 firms equals zero yields values of -1.2059, -
4.9331, and -0.3686 for L1=200, 400 and 750, respectively. Thus, still using a confidence 
level of α=0.05, we can reject this null hypothesis for type 1 firms at L1=400 estimation 
window lengths. The null hypothesis for L1=200 and L1=750 cannot be rejected. For 
type 2 firms the same test statistic yields 9.5152, -14.8252, and -6.0964, implying that 
we can reject the null hypothesis for L1=200, L1=400 and L1=750.   
 
The average cumulative abnormal returns from T1+1 to T2 that is over the entire post-
estimation window are tested for the two null hypotheses as above, but this time for the 
GARCH (1, 1) process. Under the first null hypothesis the average cumulative abnormal 
return of the GARCH (1, 1) is equal to zero. Test statistic values for L1=200 of -1.4333 
and 3.3704 for type 1 and type 2 firms, respectively are found. Similarly, based on the 
400 days estimation window, L1=400, test statistic values of 4.4490 and -2.3021 for type 1 
and type 2 firms, respectively are obtained. Finally, for the 750 days estimation window, 
L1=750, test statistic values of 2.9434 and 3.2699 for the type 1 and type 2 firms, 
respectively are found. Hence, for all estimation procedures the 200, 400 and 750 days 
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 estimation  window, apart from  L1=200  for type 1,  the null hypothesis can be rejected for 
type 1 as well as type 2 firms at a confidence level of 5%.  
 
Insert Tables 15 and 16 about here 
 
Second test, as is carried out for the case of unconditional variance, involves the null 
hypothesis that the mean sample abnormal return for both types of firms is equal. For the 
three estimation windows, i.e., L1=200, 400 and 750, we obtain test statistic values of -
0.0834, 0.2918, and 0.0219, respectively. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
equal means of the two types of firms and conclude that the sample average mean of 
abnormal returns of type 1 (private) firms is significantly higher than the one of type 
2 (state-owned) firms. 
 
Further, by testing the null hypothesis that the mean sample of GARCH cumulative 
abnormal return for both types of firms is equal, we obtain values of -60.8889, -26.5821, 
and 3.8198, providing strong evidence of an outperformance of type 1 firms.  
 




In this paper, empirical studies looking at the comparative performance of public and 
private sectors and privatization performance came under consideration through the use 
of a case study of Sweden. Financial performance of both private and state-owned 
enterprises is investigated through looking at results since the outbreak of the intensive 
privatization programmes in Sweden at the end of the 1980s. There are numerous 
studies, looking at different aspects of the relationship between public and private 
sector, and using different methods with different criteria. The results of those studies 
showed a mixed picture; some indicating the superiority of the private sector over the 
public, and some the reverse. Most of these studies used the conventional way of 
measuring corporate performance, as suggested by the neoclassical approach.  
 
This study focused on the change in the productive and allocative efficiency of privatized 
firms in Sweden over the period 1989-2007. The accounting data is deployed to analyse 
the consequences of privatization by means of an event study, calculating several 
financial ratios for the period of two years prior and the period of two years after 
privatization. Results of descriptive statistics and test results are presented in different 
tables. The descriptive statistics indicate improvements in performance of firm with 
regards to profitability, efficiency, capital structure and liquidity. This is supported by 
the tests employed. However, it is also found that there are statistical results, not 
significantly, supporting the general hypotheses that productive and allocative efficiency 
increased somehow after privatization. 
 
The pre-and-post privatization performance is being tested using another method 
known as ‘event study’ involving using share prices of the private and privatized firms 
and calculating returns to measure the financial performance on the basis of cumulative 
excess returns. The cumulative abnormal returns of the privatized firms are compared 
to those firms that experienced an IPO during the same period. The result including a 
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 conditional method of heteroskedasticity known as GARCH (1, 1) shows that the 
abnormal returns of the privatized firms are significantly different from those of the 
regular IPO firms. These results are along the lines of some international studies briefly 
presented in the introduction. 
 
Comparing the international results to the results we have found in this study, it can be 
concluded that the overall results of this study is in the line with only some of those 
studies. The Swedish enterprises did change after privatization similar to that in other 
countries, but not significantly. We offer two reasons for this: the fact is that the 
privatization program in Sweden hardly involved full privatization, and the state 
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 Figure 1: Average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) for different estimation 





 Figure 2: GARCH Average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) for different 
estimation periods of 200, 400 and 750 days. 
 
 
Table 1: State owned sample firms used to evaluate the operation performance. 
Firms Involved in 
Privatization  Year of Privatization  SIC-Code  Industry 
SSAB SVENSKT STAL AB  1989-08-16  3312  Manufacturing 
CELSIUS AB  1993-06-14  3812  Manufacturing 
ASSIDOMAN ABP  1994-03-11  2673  Manufacturing 
PHARMACIA AB  1994-06-15  2833  Manufacturing 
STADSHYPOTEK AB  1994-10-28  6162  Finance & Real Estate 
Industry 
NORDEA BANK  1995-10-23  6000  Finance & Real Estate 
Industry 
ENATOR AB  1998-03-09  7379  Services Industry 
TELIASONERA AB  2000-06-13  4813  Telecommunications 
ENIRO AB  2000-10-31  7389  Services Industry 
REZIDOR HOTEL GROUP  2005-03-14  7011  Services Industry 
 
 
Table 2: State-owned sample firms and their initial value of transaction.  
Firms Involved in Privatization  Value of Transaction in US$ million 
SSAB SVENSKT STAL AB 
CELSIUS AB           
ASSIDOMAN ABP        
PHARMACIA AB         
STADSHYPOTEK AB      
NORDEA BANK          
ENATOR AB            
TELIASONERA AB       
ENIRO AB             
REZIDOR HOTEL GROUP  
 103.39 
    95.60 
 969.70 
1249.50 
  477.80 
1001.70 
  170.70 
7646.40 
   650.83 




Table 3: Type and definition of different performance ratios.  
 
Profitability: Definition 
     Return on sales 
     Return on equity 
     Return on investment 
net income / sales 
net income  / equity 
net income  / total assets 
Operating Efficiency:   
     Sales per employee 
     Net income efficiency 
sales / total number of employees 
net income  / total number of employees 
Capital Investment:   
     Capital expenditure to sale 
     Capital expenditure to total assets 
capital expenditure / sales 
capital expenditure / total assets 
Capital Structure:   
     Equity ratio 
     Structure of short-term debts 
equity / total capital 
short-term debt / total debt 
Employment:  
     Number of employees  number of employees 
     Liquidity:   
     Liquidity  current  assets / short-term debt 
 
Table 4: Sample of IPO firms used for the event study to evaluate their financial 
performance.  
Privatized Firms  Year of IPO 
    SSAB SVENSKT STAL AB  
    CELSIUS AB             
    ASSIDOMAN AB              
    STADSHYPOTEK AB      
    NORDEA BANK          
    ENATOR AB            
    TELIASONERA AB       







2000-06-13   
2000-10-31 
Private Firms  Year of IPO 
    ARK TRAVEL   
    BILLERUD  
    CASTELLUM 
    CELLPOINT CONNECT  
    GLOCALNET (BER) 
    HOGANAS  
    ROTTNEROS  
    SKANDITEK INDRI.FRV 













Table 5a: Consequences of privatization.  
TYPE of performance indicator \ year  -2  -1  1  2 
Profitability:             
     Return on sales   -5.83  -5.65 -4.95 -6.22 
     Return on equity   -5.82  -5.62 -4.86 -6.16 
     Return on assets   -5.82  -5.69 -4.98 -6.25 
Operating Efficiency:              
     Sales per employee   5613.45  5542.75  4777.44  4190.94 
     Net income efficiency  -46.17  89.62  262.59  307.11 
Capital Investment:             
     Capital expenditure to sale   -5.75  -5.66 -4.99 -6.21 
     Capital expenditure to total assets   -5.77  -5.67 -5.00 -6.23 
Capital Structure:              
     Equity ratio   -5.26  -5.12 -4.40 -5.79 
     Structure of short-term debts   -5.51  -5.32  -4.67  -6.00 
Employment:              
     Number of employees   11315.16  10633.58  10854.35  7721.52 
     Liquidity:              
     Liquidity  54.03  -2.80  9.13  9.43 
 
Table 5b: Consequences of privatization.  
TYPE of performance\ period  DESCRIPTION     




      Return on sales  net income / sales  -5.7381  -5.5861 
      Return on equity  net income / equity  -5.7223  -5.5143 
      Return on assets  net income / total assets  -5.7557  -5.6148 
Operating Efficiency:       
      Sales per employee  sales/total number of 
employees  5578.0980 4484.1878 
      Net income efficiency  net income /tot  nr of 
employees  21.7271 284.8498 
Capital Investment:       
     Capital expenditure to sale  capital expenditure/ sales  -5.7058  -5.5999 
     Capital exp. to total assets  capital expenditure/ total assets  -5.7201  -5.6152 
Capital Structure:       
      Equity ratio  equity / total capital  -5.1895  -5.0969 
     Structure of short-term debts  short-term debt / total debt  -5.4147  -5.3353 
Employment:      
      Number of employees  number of employees  10974.3700  9287.9340 
      Liquidity:       
24 
       Liquidity  Current  assets / short-term debt  25.6161  9.2827 
 
 
Table 6: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test of median = 0.0000 versus median not = 0.0000. 
                                   Wilcoxon           Estimated 
                               N  Statistic     Prob     Median 
Return on sales               40        6.0    0.000     -5.291 
Return on equity              40        6.0    0.000     -5.334 
Return on assets              40        6.0    0.000     -5.309 
Sales per employee            40      785.0    0.000   1246.000 
Net income efficiency         40      703.0    0.000     80.540 
Capital expenditure to sale   40        6.0    0.000     -5.282 
Capital exp. to total as      40        6.0    0.000     -5.282 
Equity ratio                  40       25.0    0.000     -4.832 
Structure of short-term debts 40       14.0    0.000     -5.121 
Number of employees           40      811.0    0.000   8863.000 
Liquidity                     40      327.0    0.267     -1.151 
 
 
Table 7:  Descriptive Statistics for private firms from Sweden. 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 
Variable and period                                     Mean      SE Mean    Std Dev      Median 
 
AAR    200 Days-Swedish Private            -0.0040      0.1290        1.8300      -0.0720 
CAAR 200 Days-Swedish Private            -0.5570       0.3890       5.496 0     -0.6140 
 
AAR    400 Days-Swedish Private             0.0024       0.0823       1.6459      -0.0633 
CAAR 400 Days-Swedish Private            -2.1680       0.2410       4.8280      -2.5410 
 
AAR    750 Days-Swedish Private            -0.0059       0.0520       1.4245      -0.0720 
CAAR 750 Days-Swedish Private            -2.5630       0.1810       4.9500      -2.5040 
Note: AAR stands for average abnormal returns and CAAR for cumulative average abnormal returns. 
 
Table 8:  Descriptive Statistics for state-owned privatized firms from Sweden. 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 
Variable and period                                                Mean     SE Mean   Std Dev    Median 
 
AAR    200 Days-Swedish Privatized                   0.0473       0.0703     0.9943      0.0088 
CAAR 200 Days-Swedish Privatized                   2.6400       0.3620      5.1190     1.9920 
 
AAR    400 Days-Swedish Privatized                 -0.0318       0.0429      0.8586    -0.0514 
CAAR 400 Days-Swedish Privatized                   0.6720       0.3080      6.1510      1.1520 
 
AAR    750 Days-Swedish Privatized                  -0.0065      0.0292      0.7992     -0.0261 
CAAR 750 Days-Swedish Privatized                  -4.8170      0.2920       8.0070     -5.7240 





Table 9: Calculated AAR t-tests for three estimated windows 200, 400 and 750 of type 1 and 2 
firms.  
Type 1: Private firms 
T (AAR 200 Private) =  (-0.0040/0.1290) = -0.4385 
T (AAR 400 Private) =   (0.0024/0.0823) = 0.5832 
T (AAR 750 Private) =   (-0.0059/0.0520) =-3.1074  
 
Type 2: State-owned firms 
T (AAR 200 Privatized) =   (0.0473/0.0703) = 9.5152 
T (AAR 400 Privatized) =   (-0.0318/0.0429) =- 14.8252 
T (AAR 750 Privatized) =   (-0.0065/0.0292) =-6.0964  
Note: AAR stands for average abnormal returns.  s n T / µ =  
 
 
Table 10: Test of equality of mean average abnormal returns (AAR). 
AAR  200    T=(-0.0040-0.0470)/(0.1290-
0.0700)=-0.8688 
AAR  400    T=(-0.0024-(-0.0318))/(0.0823-
0.0429)=0.8680 





















Table 11: Calculated CAAR t-tests for three estimated windows 200, 400 and 750 of type 1 and 2 
firms.  
Type 1: private firms 
T (CAAR 200 Private) =  (-0.5570/5.4960) =- 1.4333 
T (CAAR 400 Private) =   (-2.1680/4.8280) = -8.9810 
T (CAAR 750 Private) =   (-2.5630/4.9500) = -14.1804 
 
Type 2: state-owned firms 
T (CAAR 200 Privatized) =   (2.6400/5.1190) = 7.2934 
T (CAAR 400 Privatized) =   (0.6720/6.1510) = 2.3185 
T (CAAR 750 Privatized) =   (-4.8170/8.0070) = -16.4760 
Notes: CAAR stands for cumulative average abnormal returns.  s n T / µ =  
 
 
Table 12: Test for equality of mean abnormal returns (CAR)  
CAR  200    T=(-0.5570-2.6400)/(0.3890-
0.3620)=-118.4070 
CAR  400   
T=(-2.1680-0.6720)/(0.2410-
0.3080)=-42.3900 





















Table 13:  Descriptive Statistics GARCH for private firms from Sweden. 
Descriptive Statistics: GARCH  
 
Variable and period                                        Mean   SE Mean   Std Dev    Median 
AR    GARCH 200 Sweden   Private             0.0110    0.1290     1.8300      -0.0570 
AR    GARCH 400 Sweden   Private            -0.0203    0.0823     1.6459     -0.0860 
AR    GARCH 750 Sweden   Private            -0.0070    0.0520     1.4245     -0.0731 
 
CAR GARCH 200 Sweden   Private            -0.4240     0.3890     5.4960     -0.4810 
CAR GARCH 400 Sweden   Private              1.0730    0.2410     4.8280       0.7010 
CAR GARCH 750 Sweden   Private              0.5320    0.1810     4.9500       0.5910 
Notes: AR stands for average abnormal returns, CAR for cumulative average abnormal returns and 
GARCH for generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
Table 14:  Descriptive Statistics GARCH for privatized firms from Sweden. 
Descriptive Statistics: GARCH  
 
Variable and period                                              Mean  SE Mean   Std Dev   Median 
AR    GARCH200 Sweden Privatized                0.0159    0.0703     0.9943     -0.0226 
AR    GARCH400 Sweden Privatized               -0.0318    0.0429     0.8586     -0.0514 
AR    GARCH750 Sweden Privatized               -0.0065    0.0292     0.7992     -0.0261 
 
CAR GARCH 200 Sweden Privatized                1.2200    0.3620     5.1190      0.5720 
CAR GARCH 400 Sweden Privatized               -0.7080    0.3080     6.1510     -0.2280 
CAR GARCH 750 Sweden Privatized                0.9560    0.2920     8.0070       0.0490 
Notes: AR stands for average abnormal returns, CAR for cumulative average abnormal returns and 





Table 15: Calculated T tests for three estimated windows 200, 400 and 750 GARCH of type 1and 
2 firms.  
Type 1. Private firms 
T (AAR GARCH 200 Private) =   (-0.0110/0.1290) = -1.2059 
T (AAR GARCH 400 Private) =   (-0.0203/0.0823) = -4.9331 
T (AAR GARCH 750 Private) =   (-0.0070/0.0520) =-0.3686 
 
Type 2: State-owned firms   
T (AAR GARCH 200 Privatized) =    (0.0159/0.0703) = 9.5152 
T (AAR GARCH 400 Privatized) =   (-0.0318/0.0429) =- 14.8252 
T (AAR GARCH 750 Privatized) =   (-0.0065/0.0292) =-6.0964  
Notes: AAR stands for average abnormal returns and GARCH for generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity.  s n T / µ =  
 
Table 16: Calculated T tests for three estimated windows 200, 400 and 750 GARCH of type 1 and 
2 firms.  
Type 1: Private firms 
T (CAAR GARCH 200 Private) =   (-0.4240/5.4960) =- 1.4333 
T (CAAR GARCH 400 Private) =   (1.0730/4.8280) =4.4449  
T (CAAR GARCH 750 Private) =   (0.5320/4.9500) = 2.9434 
 
Type 2:  State-owned firms   
T (CAAR GARCH 200 Privatized) =    (1.220/5.1190) = 3.3704 
T (CAAR GARCH 400 Privatized) =   (-0.7080/6.1510) = -2.3021 
T (CAAR GARCH 750 Privatized) =   (0.9560/8.007) = 3.2699 
Notes: CAAR stands for cumulative average abnormal returns and GARCH for generalized 






Table 17: Mean AR equality test (GARCH)  
AR GARCH  200    T=(0.0110-0.0159)/(0.1290-
0.0703)=-0.0834 
AR GARCH  400    T=(-0.0203-(-0.0318))/(0.0823-
0.0429)=0.2918 
















1 2 1 / / / n s n s T + − = µ µ
Notes: AR stands for abnormal returns and GARCH for generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity 
 
Table 18: Mean CAR equality test (GARCH)   
CAR GARCH  200    T=(-0.4240-1.2200)/(0.3890-
0.3620)=-60.8889 
CAR GARCH  400   
T=(1.0730-(-0.7080))/(0.2410-
0.3080)=-26.5821 
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Notes: AR stands for abnormal returns and GARCH for generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity 
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